Determinism: A Retroactive Fantasy

The Laurentius Argument for Determinism

            Free-will appears to be a meaningless concept. This is because, unlike other concepts which can be considered, free-will can only be contemplated upon with respect to time – and more than time, it can only be contemplated retroactively. That is, after it has already occurred – never existing independently of preceding phenomena. In other words, it supervenes upon the interpolating subject only after interpolation has occurred. Free will cannot be pondered without time.

            What is free-will? Free-will is the capacity to perform that which one could of otherwise performed but did not perform. However, no one has been able to perform – let alone demonstrate – that which they could of (ostensibly) otherwise chosen, but did not. In other words, it is the capacity to choose an unchosen choice. If we assume someone demonstrated that which they could of otherwise chosen, this would be a contradiction and thus cease to be an unchosen choice. No one has made an unchosen choice - only chosen choices have ever been chosen, by definition. Thus, free-will is a contradiction in terms.

        Therefore, because it is impossible, man does not have the capacity to perform that which outside the linear will. Thus, free-will is not empirical — it is a rational matter, sequestered to a small moment in time (the moment before an action). It blinds the eye of perception – sensations are not the repository of epistemology; rather, the mind is.

            The mind, distinct from sensory perception, has the capacity for imagination – that is, to reimagine what has already been done. When desire is coupled with imagination, this is fantasy. This is what free-will, at best, appears to be: the fantasy of the mind. Remembering, reimagining, and perhaps ultimately substituting unrealized real freedom with a fantastical form of freedom – maybe to compensate for the extremely abysmal, un-actualized human subject, trotting the similar abysmal life of psycho-alienation in a capitalist world.

Syllogistic Format

Argument #1: Argument from Incoherence

• A: Free will is the capacity to choose an unchosen choice
• B: It is impossible to choose an unchosen choice, otherwise it would cease to be an unchosen choice.
• C: Therefore, man does not have the capacity for freewill.

Argument #2: The Ex Post Facto Paradox

• A: Free-will is not contemplated in the moment of decision – it is contemplated after a decision has happened, in order to distinguish the unchosen choice from the chosen choice.
• B: Therefore, the concept of free-will is contingent on the assumption of preceding choices
• C: Therefore, free-will is retroactively imagined rather than having a correspondence with reality as it exists in the moment of a decision.
• D: Therefore, if free-will can only be retroactively imagined after a choice has been made, it cannot exist in any sense to decision making.